Rich empirical study with less football than could be expected

Torbjörn Andersson
Dept. of Sport Sciences, Malmö University

Clearly, fascism’s relationship with football is one of the most interesting topics in football history. Football was modernized by Italian fascism in the 1920s, with the result that World Cup gold was won by Italy in both 1934 and 1938 and an Olympic gold medal was salvaged in between. The most successful and well-known team in the history of the world is still the Real Madrid, which during the second half of the 1950’s racked up European Cup victories during the fascist Franco’s time in power. Nazi Germany, on the other hand, was uninterested in football and chose to stop the probable introduction of professionalism in Germany. And so, any propaganda gains via football failed due to the national team’s embarrassing efforts in both the Berlin Olympics in 1936 and the France World Cup in 1938, where the small nations Norway and Switzerland became overpowering.

Somewhat overshadowed by Spain, Portugal had an authoritarian regime in power between 1926 and 1974. Lisbon’s top team Benfica took over Real Madrid’s international leadership in the early 60s with European Cup victories in both 1961 and 1962. In addition, Sporting Lisbon won the slightly less prestigious Cup Winners’ Cup in 1964. Two years later, Portugal finished third in the World Cup, where the team’s black star Eusébio stood out. All this took place towards the end of the fascist dictator António de Oliveira Salazar’s long reign (1932–1968), where he directed his political project The New State (Estado Novo). One is undeniably curious about how a poor and peripheral country with just over eight million inhabitants could reap such success in the world’s biggest sport. Therefore, it was with great anticipation that I began to read Rahul Kumar’s book Football and Fascism with the exciting subtitle The Politics of Popular Culture in Portugal. The back cover blurb claimed that the book offered award-winning research.

Kumar argues convincingly that football was not used as an opium for the people, which otherwise would have been an almost accepted view.

Imagine my surprise, then, when what should have been the culmination of Kumar’s research – fascism’s relationship to the triumphant Portuguese football of the 1960s – barely appears at all. Instead, it is the long prehistory that is carefully treated and not always with football in focus, which is further surprising, given the book’s unambiguous main title. It becomes even more frustrating when it turns out that Salazar’s fascist government showed no real interest in football; in many ways, it was reminiscent of Nazism’s moderate enthusiasm for the game. The amateur ideal was maintained, professionalization was slow, although there was an early stealth professionalism. Against this backdrop, the spectacular success of Benfica, Sporting and the national team seems even more in need of explanation.

Despite my disappointment with the book created by its title, there is of course a lot of interesting things to learn about. As a Swede, one is amazed at the great importance that was attached to Ling gymnastics; it was trusted in contrast to the more suspicious, potentially unruly, sport of football. Kumar devotes almost as much space to various forms of gymnastics and other sports as he does to football. Overall, football was difficult for the regime to discipline, despite clear efforts from the beginning of the 1940s. There was a fear that football, in addition to conflicts around players and spectators, would also awaken a nationally divisive local patriotism – not least between Porto and Lisbon. In addition, for a long time the national team was so sadly inferior that any propaganda value was completely lacking.

Furthermore, the football clubs were difficult to politicize as they were non-profit member associations with a tradition of independence. The development of football was slow, and the first international match was not played until 1921. A national league was not played until 1938. Only one grass pitch existed in the country as late as 1928! Kumar argues convincingly that football was not used as an opium for the people, which otherwise would have been an almost accepted view. And to complicate matters, the ruling party lacked a mass base that could be mobilized. The focus of the analysis is on the state. The author does not seem to have had access to the clubs’ archival material – unfortunately often the case in international football research – which is why the actions of the big clubs have become difficult to include in the Bourdieu-inspired field analysis.

Clearly, Portugal’s football miracle was recent. A grand national arena was inaugurated in 1944 but was not completed until the mid-1950s. It is then that the country’s big clubs gain momentum, large stadiums are built, and professional football is officially introduced in 1960, just before Benfica wins the European Cup. To some extent, this shows that international football was still undeveloped, so that success could sometimes happen quickly if skilled players were available; Lengthy modernization processes were not always necessary. As in many other places, it was Hungarian coaches who were behind the more advanced development of the game itself. Also very important was the recruitment of players from colonies such as Mozambique and Angola, a process that started in the 1950s.

My disappointment at the lack of a deeper analysis of the football success of the 1960s does not prevent me from being impressed by Kumar’s study with its rich empirical details. For an international readership, it would have been even more interesting if more comparisons had been made with other contemporary authoritarian European regimes: Italy, Germany, Spain and Greece. For Kumar’s book shows that the differences were probably as great as the similarities. In any case, it is clearly positive that studies are now made available in English about a small, but significant football nation like Portugal.

Copyright © Torbjörn Andersson 2024